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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

24 JUNE 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

24 June 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 25)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 JUNE 1970

Moscow (3669 items)

Supreme Soviet Elections	(36%)	18%
[Brezhnev Speech	(12%)	6%]
Soyuz 9	(7%)	12%
China	(7%)	6%
Indochina	(3%)	7%
Kosygin Speech at	(--)	4%
Luncheon for		
U Thant		
Anniversary of	(--)	3%
Nazi Invasion		
of USSR		
International	(9%)	3%
Communist		
Party Meeting		
in Moscow,		
1st Anniversary		
Swedish Premier Palme	(--)	2%
in USSR		

Peking (3135 items)

Indochina	(37%)	48%
[Cambodia	(25%)	30%]
[Mao's Statement	(1%)	6%]
[Vietnam	(6%)	5%]
[Laos	(1%)	3%]
Domestic Issues	(17%)	21%
Somali Government	(--)	9%
Delegation in		
PRC		
Middle East	(4%)	4%
Romanian Leader	(26%)	3%
Bodnaras in		
PRC		
Sino-Japanese	(--)	3%
Fishery Talks		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist attacks on the Nixon Administration's "aggression" throughout Indochina and alleged duplicity at the Paris talks continue along standard lines. The tone is typified by a Hanoi radio commentary on 19 June, pegged to the President's TV speech on the economy on the 17th, which says that "if Nixon refuses to look at the truth and to put an end to the war, the U.S. economy will undergo unpredictably more serious consequences, and his career will collapse like Johnson's."

Soviet attacks on U.S. "aggression" in Cambodia and the rest of Indochina include a 21 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov which is notable for its direct censure of the President. Zhukov does not discuss U.S. Indochina policy in the context of Soviet-U.S. relations. But in conclusion he does quote Brezhnev's remark, in his 12 June election speech, that by the expansion of the war into Cambodia, U.S. leaders are merely expanding their military and political defeats both in Indochina and beyond.

Current Soviet propaganda is not marked by the attacks on Peking's Indochina policy that had become a propaganda staple since the inception of the Cambodian crisis. But Peking's most direct, though still implicit, criticism of Moscow's policy on Cambodia comes in the 25 June joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY editorial on the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. It says that at a time when Asian peoples are strengthening their unity in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, "there are certain persons who are collaborating with U.S. imperialism in evil doings . . . , even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like."

While Peking had not commented independently on Soviet failure to recognize the Sihanouk government, NCNA on 12 May carried an attack by the Burmese CP, which said that "the Soviet revisionist clique dares not denounce the counterrevolutionary Lon Nol clique by name and has not dared up to now" to recognize Sihanouk's government. Allusions to the Soviets also seemed evident in Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement in which he noted pointedly that the new Cambodian government had been recognized by "nearly 20" regimes, as well as in Kang Sheng's 9 June banquet speech for a delegation from Romania in which he praised that country as one of the first to extend recognition.

## CAMBODIAN ACTION DESCRIBED, INDOCHINA "VICTORIES" HAILED

Propaganda on recent military action in Cambodia includes Liberation and Hanoi broadcasts on 19 and 20 June, respectively, which cite the Western press in reporting the cutting off of Phnom Penh. Hanoi

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observes that "the Cambodian patriotic forces have severed all roads linking Phnom Penh with the provinces, thus making the capital almost completely isolated." VNA on the 20th, citing the Information Bureau of the United National Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), rounds up selected military actions in June and says that Chhep and Chey Seng districts of Preah Vihear Province were "completely liberated" on the 13th when the local armed forces and people "rose up in insurrection." VNA also mentions action adjacent to the Thai border, saying that the "patriotic forces" on 19 June attacked government forces in Pai Lin "about two kilometers from the Thai border."

In hailing the "victories" of the first 15 days of June on the battlefields of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Liberation Radio on the 19th comments that the "most striking point" of the Cambodian situation during the first half of the month was that the "Cambodian revolutionary forces continued to develop by leaps and bounds, qualitatively and quantitatively." LPA on 20 June routinely describes the exploits of the "armed forces and people in Indochina" as attaining a "new stage" in the respective anti-U.S. struggles of the three peoples.

Comment on the war in South Vietnam includes an 18 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which does not dwell on military feats but stresses the importance of strengthening bases in "liberated areas." The DRV army paper says it is necessary to "build political organs" in areas under allied control and to develop guerrilla warfare in adjacent areas to contain the enemy.

PATHET LAO DENIAL OF TROOPS IN ANGKOR WAT      Following Hanoi's denunciation on the 13th of the "fabricated news" put out by the Phnom Penh regime that 10,000 Vietnamese communist troops, including Pathet Lao and Chinese elements, were quartered in the Angkor Wat temple complex, the Pathet Lao news agency KPL issued an "authorized" denial dated 17 June. As publicized by Pathet Lao radio on the 18th and by VNA on the 20th, the statement "absolutely" denies "foreign reports from Cambodia" to the effect that Pathet Lao units were operating in Siem Reap-Angkor Wat area of Cambodia.

#### ACTIVITIES OF MINISTERS IN SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

DELEGATION TO INDIA, CEYLON      On 19 June VNA cited the FUNK information office as reporting that a delegation of the Royal Government of National Union, led by Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak and Minister of Popular Education and Youth Chan Youran, had spent the week of 10-17 June in India, where they

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were received by and had a "cordial talk" with Prime Minister Gandhi, External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, and Foreign Secretary Kaul. VNA noted that Mme. Gandhi affirmed "sympathy with and respect for Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia," expressing hope that the Cambodian people would soon recover the peace, independence, and neutrality of their country. VNA said the delegation left India on the 17th to visit "a number of African countries." An 18 June NCNA report of the meeting with Indian officials adds that Sarin Chhak, asked at a press conference if there was any possibility that Sihanouk would "come to the conference table" with Lon Nol, responded by asking rhetorically how it would be possible for Sihanouk to hold talks with a "traitor."

On the 23d, NCNA reported that the delegation visited Ceylon from the 18th to the 22d. Neither VNA nor NCNA has raised the question of possible recognition of Sihanouk's government by India\* or Ceylon. But AFP on the 22d described the visit to Ceylon as an effort to add it to the countries which have recognized the government; the report noted that according to Chhak, Mrs. Bandaranaike said Ceylon would not recognize the Phnom Penh regime headed by Lon Nol. (AFP reported that the delegation left on the 22d for Cairo.)

PEKING MEETING OF  
PENN NOUTH, MME. BINH

LPA reported on 19 June, as Peking had done earlier, that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh had met with Chou En-lai in

Peking on the 17th. Another LPA item the same day said that she also met with Sihanouk and his prime minister, Penn Nouth, while in Peking. (On the 18th PTI reported that Mme. Binh will visit India from 20 to 26 July, having been invited by External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh last September when he was in Hanoi for Ho Chi Minh's funeral.)

#### PARIS TALKS: ROUTINE DEMANDS FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL REPEATED

Consistent with recent practice, the VNA account of the 71st session of the Paris talks on 18 June glosses over much of the detail of the communist delegates' speeches and barely acknowledges the allied delegates' remarks. PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien reiterated

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\* The Bombay PTI reported on 18 June that Sihanouk's government is "expected shortly" to set up an "information bureau" in New Delhi and that the question was discussed by Sarin Chhak during his visit.

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in standard terms the two basic demands--a complete U.S. withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition government. The LPA account, but not VNA, notes that Tien reiterated the PRG's proposal that if the United States would declare its intention to unconditionally withdraw all its forces within six months, then the parties concerned would discuss the withdrawal timetable as well as the question of insuring safety for the withdrawing troops.

The VNA account reports that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy termed a "hoax" U.S. delegate Habib's remark at the previous session that the United States was prepared to act on the principle of a withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam. But it does not acknowledge Vy's criticism of the "dribble" withdrawals and the Administration's refusal to announce a timetable for complete withdrawal, or his caustic remark that despite the President's claims he in fact has no timetable. The account notes Vy's observation that the United States is still pursuing its unreasonable demands at Paris but omits his specification of these demands as the call for a mutual troop withdrawal--which Vy routinely described as a "notorious" proposal--and maintenance of the GVN.

VNA reports Vy's comment that President Nixon's statements in his 3 June address regarding continued U.S. air strikes in Cambodia and the possibility of continuing ARVN ground operations in Cambodia amount to "a completely new version" of the policy the President had enunciated at his 3 May news conference. (The account, however, does not fully report that Vy presented his version of what the President said on 8 May--that intruding U.S. forces would go no further than 35 kilometers and that by 30 June all U.S. and Saigon troops would be withdrawn and all U.S. air support missions would cease.)

ALLIED As in last week's account, VNA fails to offer its  
SPEECHES usual terse description of the allied delegates' presentations. Nor does it even extend the courtesy of naming Ambassadors Lam and Habib. VNA simply says that "for all their phraseological efforts, the delegates of the U.S. and Saigon administration failed to make their arguments sound in any way different from what they had said previously, which largely illustrated the United States' unwillingness to stop its policy of aggression and to negotiate seriously for a fair and just settlement of the Vietnam problem."

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## VNA BELATEDLY NOTES GVN PLAN TO RELEASE DRV PRISONERS

A VNA "authorized" statement on 23 June conveys the DRV's belated reaction to GVN delegate Lam's announcement, at the 11 June Paris session, of his government's intention to release a group of North Vietnamese wounded prisoners and captured fishermen on 11 July. Ignoring the fact that the issue came up at Paris,\* the statement says that "on orders from the United States," the Saigon administration on 11 June again raised the issue of releasing a group of 24 North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 "other people who were arrested and have been illegally detained by them in South Vietnam and whom they call 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'" It states categorically that "since all Vietnamese citizens have the right to live on Vietnamese territory," the United States and the Saigon administration "must free all Vietnamese patriots illegally arrested and imprisoned in South Vietnam."

The statement concludes by stating that past practice must be followed and by outlining provisions, including release of the prisoners at the 17th parallel or at a place adjacent to the sea areas of the DRV. The statement routinely calls on the United States and the GVN to immediately free all other DRV "citizens" who have been illegally arrested and detained.

## MOSCOW SCORES U.S. "AGGRESSION," SILENT ON CONFERENCE ISSUE

ZHUKOV           An unusually sharp attack is leveled at President  
IN PRAVDA       Nixon by Yuri Zhukov in a 21 June PRAVDA article  
                  which has been summarized by TASS and broadcast by  
Moscow radio in foreign languages including Vietnamese and  
Cambodian. After graphically describing the action in Cambodia,  
including casualties sustained by civilians, Zhukov says that  
"all this President Nixon dares to call concern for 'consolidating  
peace throughout the world,' at the same time boasting that his  
operation in Cambodia 'has proven the most successful throughout  
this prolonged and arduous war!' Such an interweaving of  
brutality and hypocrisy is truly monstrous." Despite this direct  
attack on the President, Zhukov does not discuss U.S. Indochina  
policy in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. But in conclusion  
he does quote Brezhnev's remark in his 12 June election speech that

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\* See the 17 June TRENDS, page 5.

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by expanding the war "Washington leaders are expanding only the scale of their future defeats on a military and political front, both in Indochina itself and beyond, and in their own country also."

The bulk of the article consists of quotations from the foreign press, and Zhukov cites reports that even after the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Cambodia "the level of military actions will remain higher than at the end of April" through the use of allied "puppets" and U.S. "artillery, air, and material assistance." He even accuses the United States of using "nuclear blackmail," saying the Western press has noted that nuclear weaponry is present in the region of Southeast Asia. Noting Soviet support for the Cambodians, Zhukov says the Soviet Government has expressed "sympathy and support" for the Cambodian struggle and recalls the 14 May CEMA statement and Brezhnev's 19 May message to the Cairo conference on Laos.

U THANT IN Moscow's avoidance of the issue of a conference on  
MOSCOW Indochina is pointed up in its treatment of UN  
Secretary General U Thant's Moscow visit.

Consistent with Soviet media's failure to acknowledge U Thant's 11 June call for a 15-nation conference, propaganda on his 17-21 June visit not only fails to mention a political settlement, but says little about Indochina. On the 19th TASS quoted Thant at a Kremlin luncheon as denouncing the "barbarous war" in Vietnam and criticizing "recent events" in Cambodia, and as adding vaguely that the conversations "showed that his attitude to the war in Cambodia coincides almost completely with that of the Soviet Union."

Vietnamese communist media are not known to have mentioned Thant's Moscow visit, although both Hanoi and the Liberation Front denounced his 11 June call for a conference. Peking says nothing about a political settlement on its own authority, but MCNA and Peking radio have carried LPA and VNA commentaries denouncing U Thant's statement on a conference.\*

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\* Communist reaction to U Thant's statement is discussed in the 17 June TRENDS, pages 8-9.

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SOVIET-SWEDISH  
COMMUNIQUE

The Soviet-Swedish communique on Prime Minister Olof Palme's visit, carried in the Moscow domestic service on the 19th, says both sides underlined the need for "all foreign troops" to be withdrawn from Indochina and for the peoples of the region to have the opportunity to decide their own future. It adds that both sides pointed to the need for a "political solution to the Vietnam problem on the basis of the Geneva agreement of 1954."

But Kosygin in a luncheon speech on the 17th, as reported by TASS, said merely that peace-loving states "demand an end to American aggression in Indochina and strict respect for the right of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to decide independently their own affairs."

DJAKARTA CONFERENCE  
THREE-NATION MISSION

Soviet propaganda is not known to have mentioned the Moscow visit of the Djakarta conference three-nation mission which met with Gromyko on 17 June. But according to Djakarta's ANTARA press agency on the 18th, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said that on the issue of an international conference Gromyko merely referred to Kosygin's 4 May remarks that the initiative should come from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. And on the 22d ANTARA quoted Malik further as reporting that Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union had never wanted the ICC suspended in Cambodia--a remark that Malik said showed that the USSR shared the view of the Djakarta conference, which wanted to reactivate the ICC.

Although Soviet propaganda ignores the presence of the mission, an attack on the Djakarta conference along the lines of earlier comment appears in a TASS commentary on the 18th, published in IZVESTIYA the next day. It repeats earlier propaganda in charging that the conference was composed of "direct accomplices of U.S. aggression in Indochina" and that it constituted an attempt to "divert attention" from the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. It concludes with the standard demand for a U.S. troop withdrawal.

The three-nation mission is mentioned briefly in a communique on talks between Japanese and Chinese fishery associations, carried by NCNA on 20 June. The communique merely scores the mission for engaging in "scheming activities of all descriptions" but does not mention its visit to Moscow.

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SIHANOUK      Speaking in Pyongyang on 18 June Sihanouk once again  
REMARKS      decried the "maneuvers" of the Djakarta conference  
             governments of Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, "in  
             conspiracy with U Thant," to undermine the anti-U.S. front "under  
             the pretext of bringing peace to Cambodia." He went on to demand  
             that the United States respect the Geneva agreements of 1954 and  
             1962, saying that "no new international conference" is needed.  
             "All that is necessary," he said, is for the United States to withdraw  
             its troops and those of its allies "immediately, unconditionally, and  
             totally." He had seemed less categorical at a Pyongyang banquet  
             on the 15th when he said that "we, of course, do not refuse a  
             peaceful solution of the Cambodian problem" but that if the United  
             States does not accept troop withdrawal "no conference is  
             acceptable to us."

Peking's NCNA, carrying considerable reportage of Sihanouk's visit  
to Korea, has transmitted the full text of his rally speech. On  
the other hand, the brief TASS account includes the call for U.S.  
troop withdrawal and adherence to the Geneva agreements but deletes  
the reference to a conference.

#### SOUPHANOUVONG SENDS SECOND LETTER TO SOUVANNA ON LAOS TALKS

On 18 June the Pathet Lao news agency released another letter from  
NLHX Chairman Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma,  
answering the latter's 9 April letter defining the RLG position  
on negotiations and the NLHX five-point statement of 6 March.  
Souvanna's letter had been in reply to Souphanouvong's first letter,  
dated 10 March and delivered in Vientiane on the 22d, which  
pressed the NLHX five-point proposal and urged that Souvanna agree  
to "an immediate, complete, and unconditional halt to the U.S.  
bombing raids against Laos to create conditions for all parties  
concerned in Laos to negotiate and to solve Laotian internal  
affairs." In his reply on 9 April Souvanna reaffirmed that the  
U.S. air strikes would cease once the North Vietnamese forces  
withdrew from Laos.\*

In his current letter Souphanouvong makes the standard charge that  
U.S. actions in Laos--the bombings, the introduction of Thai and  
South Vietnamese "mercenaries," and the repeated "nibbling attacks"

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\* Souphanouvong's first letter is discussed in the 25 March 1970  
TRENDS, pages 15-16. The NLHX five-point statement is discussed  
in the 11 March TRENDS, pages 6-8.

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on the patriotic forces' zones--have created a "grave situation." He expresses "hope" that Souvanna Phouma "will join us in finding positive measures" to achieve a peaceful settlement in Laos and prevent new U.S. "military adventures." Souphanouvong reaffirms that the five-point NLHX statement of 6 March constitutes the "correct basis" for a settlement and says again that "the Lao patriotic front is ready to meet the other parties concerned immediately after the complete and unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombardments against Lao territory."

TASS promptly summarized the letter on the 19th, VNA having carried it on the 18th. Peking thus far has ignored the letter.

#### HANOI CLAIMS SHELLING OF DRV, ASSAILS JUNE "CRIMES"

A 20 June DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claims that the United States "launched artillery attacks from positions south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and from the open sea" against Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages in the northern part of the DMZ on 16 June. On 18 June, it says, U.S. aircraft fired rockets at fishing boats of the coastal areas of Ky Xuan Village, Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province. It further charges that the United States also launched artillery attacks from positions south of the DMZ against some areas of the northern part of the DMZ, "using toxic chemical shells, thus affecting many innocent people." In standard fashion, the spokesman "sternly condemned these criminal acts" and demanded an immediate halt to all actions violating DRV sovereignty and security.

The most recent previous ministry spokesman's protests, on 27 and 30 May, charged the United States with using B-52's to bomb the DMZ. U.S. "war crimes" committed in both North and South Vietnam in the first half of June were documented in a DRV War Crimes Commission communique, carried by VNA on 18 June. Routine in nature, the communique enumerated charges of continued reconnaissance flights, alleged U.S. bombings in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area, and offshore naval patrols said to threaten the "normal life and activities" of fishermen. It scored "indiscriminate U.S. bombing raids against populous areas near Saigon" and "stepped-up repression" by the GVN against youths, students, Buddhists, and the press.

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## DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION VISIT TO EAST EUROPE

On 23 June VNA reports the composition of a DRV National Assembly delegation, headed by Hoang Van Hoan, Politburo member and vice chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, which will "pay a friendship visit" to a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe at the invitation of their national assemblies. (The communique of the last National Assembly Standing Committee meeting reported by VNA on 11 June, had noted that the committee had decided to send a delegation "to several fraternal socialist countries.") On the same day, VNA notes that the delegation left Hanoi that day and was seen off by Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh. An NCNA item on the 2<sup>nd</sup> cryptically reports that the delegation had arrived in Peking that afternoon "on its way to other countries." It says they were welcomed at the airport by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who gave a banquet in their honor that evening.

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 24th describes the delegation's tour as "an event of important significance for the further consolidation and development of the existing relations of friendship between the DRV National Assembly and people and the national assemblies and peoples of the brother countries." The paper notes the "great importance" the DRV attaches to the "friendship, militant solidarity and mutual support" between it and the other socialist countries. Recalling a similar visit in July-August 1965,\* it says that the current visit "again shows the determination of our state and people to fulfill" the task of strengthening solidarity. It routinely thanks the countries for their "hearty support and assistance." Going on to hail the "strength of unity and struggle" of the three Indochinese peoples as "invincible", it stresses that the socialist countries' "support and assistance" make up an "important factor" for their victory. It declares that in the present stage the "sympathy and support of the brother socialist countries bears a significance of even greater importance."

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\* The delegation in 1965 was similarly headed by Hoang Van Hoan and it visited the PRC, DPRK, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union.

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## K O R E A

## DPRK ANNOUNCES FOUNDING OF "MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY" IN ROK

On 20 June KCNA announced the establishment of a "Marxist-Leninist party" in South Korea, reporting that "South Korean revolutionaries" formed the "central committee of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification" in August 1969 and adopted a party manifesto and program.\* Later on the 20th KCNA carried a NODONG SINMUN editorial effusively praising the founding of this "Marxist-Leninist party" as a "historic event" and a "new turning point" in the South Korean revolution. The editorial recalls that many times in the past Kim Il-song has emphasized the necessity of building such a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in the South to guide the revolution. It says the building of the party now "fully meets the urgent demands of the development of the South Korean revolution and completely accords with the subjective and objective situation prevailing in South Korea."

KCNA says that the Revolutionary Party for Reunification was formed in March 1964 as "an illegal revolutionary organization." This is apparently the same organization as--or an outgrowth of--the United Revolutionary Party first known to have been mentioned in August 1968. Although KCNA in English now refers to the "Revolutionary Party for Reunification," the version in Korean is Tongil Hyonmyong Tang--the same Korean title of what has previously been referred to in English as the United Revolutionary Party. Further evidence that the parties are identical is that the founding date of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, March 1964, has previously been cited as that of the United Revolutionary Party. The "organ" of the new party, REVOLUTIONARY FRONT, has been identified in the past with the United Revolutionary Party, although the "journal" CHONGMAEK has been given more publicity.

Calls for a vanguard "Marxist-Leninist" party date back to Kim Il-song's speech at the Fourth KWP Congress in September 1961 and appeared repeatedly in subsequent propaganda. References

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\* KCNA says the details were reported in a "recent" issue of the party organ REVOLUTIONARY FRONT. It says the manifesto and program were published "recently" in a number of foreign papers, including the U.S. BLACK PANTHER, the Manchester GUARDIAN, and several African and Japanese papers. The documents are known to have appeared in the Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE on 10 March 1970.

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to scattered "revolutionary organizations" appeared concurrently but with no suggestion that any of them was a forerunner of the Marxist-Leninist party. Since August 1968, the United Revolutionary Party has received considerable publicity as an "underground revolutionary organization" to which a fairly elaborate organizational structure was attributed. In one known instance, a 14 February 1969 NODONG SINMUN editorial article denouncing the execution in the ROK of one of the party's leaders, it was called a "Marxist-Leninist underground revolutionary organization."\*

**MANIFESTO & PROGRAM** The manifesto claims that "local organizations" of the "revolutionary party" were formed "long ago" and that now the "central leading body" has been organized. The Revolutionary Party for Reunification, it says, is a "new-type Marxist-Leninist party" guided by Kim Il-song's idea of "chuche," the "original embodiment of Marxism-Leninism in the present era and in the actual conditions of our country." The party's first task, says the manifesto, is to "carry out the people's democratic revolution in South Korea," overthrow the "corrupt, colonial, semifeudal system," set up a "people's democratic system," and accomplish national unification.

The 12-point party program calls for the overthrow of the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and the establishment of an "independent democratic government." It includes points on land reform, nationalization of industry, labor laws, women's rights, cultural development, education, and public health, and it calls for the formation of "national self-defense armed forces," the realization of "independent diplomacy," and "friendship with the anti-imperialist peace-loving countries." It concludes with a reassertion of the goal of "independent peaceful unification of the country."

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\* See the 27 February 1969 FBIS SURVEY, pages 11-15, for a discussion of the propaganda on the execution of the party leader and background on calls for a "Marxist-Leninist party" in the South. Propaganda on the execution of another party leader is noted in the SURVEY of 17 July 1969, page 16. A discussion of "revolutionary organizations" in the South may also be found in FBIS Special Report on Communist Propaganda RS. 91 of 10 December 1968, "Pyongyang Statements since April 1968 on Korean Unification and the South Korean 'Struggle.'"

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW'S OFFENSIVE ABATES, PEKING CONTINUES RESTRAINT

As Peking continues by and large to maintain its propaganda standdown toward the Soviets, Moscow's polemical offensive set off by the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article seems to have spent its force. Since publication of election speeches delivered by the three top Soviet leaders from 10 to 12 June, the Soviet central press has ignored China, with the bulk of Moscow's comment on China appearing in broadcasts beamed to the Chinese.

TRUD ON      Apart from citing the leaders' speeches, which blamed  
BORDERS      the Chinese for causing an impasse at the Peking talks,  
Soviet propaganda has avoided the border question. However, an article in TRUD on the 12th, appearing on the third day of the successive speeches by Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Brezhnev attacking the Chinese for impeding the Sino-Soviet border talks, discusses in suggestive detail how the Soviets and Turks are going about redemarcating their border. The article does not mention any borders other than those with Turkey, but its discussion is replete with implications for the Sino-Soviet negotiations. In a PRAVDA article on 28 May the Soviet border guards commander, Col. Gen. P. Zyryanov, had mentioned the Sino-Soviet talks alongside references to work on demarcation of the Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran.

Presented in the form of reportage from a site where work on delimiting the border is being conducted, the TRUD article explains that redemarcation has been necessitated by changes wrought by nature since border treaties were signed in the 1920's. Among such changes it cites those affecting river beds and islands which have disappeared, have joined the other country's bank, or have been newly formed. Explaining that the border is always the most sensitive barometer of interstate relations, the article observes that the slightest complication in any sector, "even the tiniest," can lead to "serious conflict." For this reason, it adds, the Soviet Government offered to make the existing border "more precise," and talks were held in which an agreement was reached on the basis that there would be an exact balancing of awards of land to each side in the course of the redemarcation.

The approach set forth in the article suggests how the Soviets might be prepared to make adjustments with the Chinese on such questions as the disputed river islands. Thus, it would be compatible with

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this approach for Moscow to grant to the Chinese certain islands over which the Soviets have exercised jurisdiction, receiving in exchange Chinese acknowledgment of Soviet possession of islands regarded as more valuable to Soviet security. At the same time, the article reflects Moscow's insistence that in principle and as a whole the Soviet borders are fixed, admitting only of a more precise demarcation to eliminate ambiguities and to take account of natural changes.

NCNA ON SOVIETS      The Chinese have permitted themselves various polemical slaps at the Soviets, while avoiding giving an impression of intent to reopen major polemics which might alienate the Asian parties the Chinese have been trying to cultivate. NCNA on 18 June took to task a minor Soviet "expert on Japan" visiting that country for having appealed in a speech for Soviet-Japanese cooperation to cope with revolutionaries in China, Vietnam, and Korea. Though the NCNA report contains a passing reference to "the renegade features of the Soviet revisionists," it is mainly designed to score easy points at the expense of Moscow's reputation among the Asian parties without undercutting the effects of Peking's current polemical restraint.

According to NCNA, citing a report in MAINICHI, the Soviet speaker indicated that Asia is the most dangerous area in the world because it contains three of the four split countries--that is, China and Taiwan, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam. NCNA thus contrived to play on Pyongyang's concern over Soviet dealings with Japan and to associate Peking's claim on Taiwan with North Korean and North Vietnamese aspirations for reuniting their divided countries.\* The NCNA report has been given wide dissemination in Peking broadcasts, presumably in keeping with NCNA's explanation that it was reporting the speech "specially for the entertainment of all."

Japan also figured in another reminder of Peking's rivalry with Moscow, an NCNA report on the 22d that Chou En-lai and Kuo Mo-jo had received the Japanese authors of "Is the Soviet Union a Socialist Country?" and members of a visiting Japanese "antirevisionist" youth delegation.

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\* A Peking joint editorial dated 25 June, marking the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war, also seeks to associate Peking's and Pyongyang's irredentist claims by charging in its opening sentence that 20 years ago the United States "launched a war of aggression against Korea, and two days later it occupied by force China's sacred territory Taiwan province."

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Peking's propaganda against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, highlighted by a 23 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, avoided attacking the Soviets while playing on common interests of the PRC and the DPRK vis-a-vis Japan. Peking's joint editorial on the Korean war anniversary, however, indirectly attacks the Soviets in charging that unnamed "certain persons" are "collaborating with U.S. imperialism in evil doings, fraternizing with the Japanese reactionaries, and even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like."

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## SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

## PRC SAYS TIME NOT SUITABLE FOR SETTING WARSAW MEETING DATE

Peking announced on 20 June that the Chinese liaison officer for the Warsaw talks notified his American counterpart that day that it would not be suitable at this time to set a date for the next session of the ambassadorial talks. The announcement said the date for the next session will be discussed "at the proper time" through the liaison personnel.

Unlike Peking's announcement on the postponement of the meeting scheduled for 20 May, which cited the U.S. incursion into Cambodia as the reason for the postponement, the current announcement points only to the fact "that both sides clearly understand the current situation." Thus the announcement carefully leaves the door open for a resumption of the talks after the United States winds up its involvement in Cambodia, while indicating to Moscow that Peking intends to continue using this channel as part of its effort to acquire leverage against the Soviets.

Chinese comment on the Nixon Administration and Indochinese developments seems inconclusive regarding what sort of atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. relations would be regarded as suitable for a resumption of the Warsaw talks. A commentary carried by NCNA on 7 June for domestic publication indulged in venomous personal vilification of the President, but, significantly, it was not disseminated abroad by NCNA and has been monitored from Radio Peking only in Korean and Japanese. Comment on Washington's declared intent to withdraw American troops from Cambodia by 30 June has characterized the U.S. position as deceitful and designed to mollify the American people. NCNA on the 7th and PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 8th, discussing the President's 3 June speech, noted that he indicated U.S. bombing of Cambodia would continue after the withdrawal and Saigon troops would remain, thus showing that the United States is persisting in its "aggression."

A 14 June NCNA report on remarks by Secretary Rogers on the 7th and 9th observed that "Rogers, just like Nixon, hypocritically declared" that American troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia. NCNA described the promised withdrawal as "a lame attempt" to appease public opinion and "a smokescreen for continued aggression." After quoting the Secretary as

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saying the United States hopes the Lon Nol regime does not fall, NCNA said Washington intends under the Nixon doctrine to use its "lackeys and puppets" to carry on the fighting in Indochina but predicted that the United States "will have to take the field again" when "it turns out that its lackeys cannot win the war either." NCNA termed any attempt by the "three traitorous cliques" in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok to form a military alliance "under the aegis of U.S. imperialism" a provocation against the people in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole, but it failed to define the PRC's stake in the matter.

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## BRITISH ELECTIONS

## MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON IMPLICATIONS OF CONSERVATIVE VICTORY

Moscow treats the upset victory of the Conservatives in the 18 June British Parliamentary elections as a vote not so much for the Conservatives as against the policies of the Laborites, both domestic and foreign. Pre-election comment had described the differences between the two parties on foreign policy as negligible and portrayed the contest as being waged primarily over domestic issues--essentially minor questions of reform within the British capitalist system. Commentators now picture the vote as an expression of deep dissatisfaction with Labor's economic policies and as a rejection of U.S.-oriented foreign policy positions from which the new government will have to draw the appropriate conclusions.

Addressing British listeners on the 22d, a Radio Moscow commentator suggested that one conclusion the Heath government might draw from the election was the need "to put maximum effort into restoring Britain's prestige on the world scene as a big power"--a policy which "entails a more independent foreign policy course than the one the Labor Party was following." Citing the fact that citizens in the 18 to 20 age group were permitted to vote as one factor contributing to the outcome, a panelist in the 21 June domestic radio roundtable observed that "the majority of British young people" opposed U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and voted against "the Labor leaders' subservience to U.S. foreign policy."

Prognostications are avoided in Moscow's typically cautious initial comment on the vote. Panelists in the roundtable broadcast saw the defeat of the Labor government as a vote against its positions on such issues as NATO and entry into the Common Market--issues cited in Moscow's pre-election comment as areas of agreement between Laborites and Conservatives. A 20 June broadcast in English tailored for African audiences contained the only speculation on a specific foreign policy course of the new regime, seeing as "well-grounded" the hopes of South African and Rhodesian "racialists" that the Conservative government will "strengthen contacts with them, lift the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa, and reopen its mission in the Rhodesian capital."

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## WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS

### MOSCOW SEES NO CHANGE IN BRANDT POLICY DESPITE CDU POLITICKING

Low-volume Moscow propaganda on the 14 June West German Laender elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and the Saarland concentrates on attacking CDU efforts to "torpedo" Brandt's Ostpolitik but concludes that these efforts have been largely unsuccessful and that the elections will leave Brandt's policy substantially unchanged.

The size of the CDU vote is traced to the support of voters from the "neo-Nazi" NPD. On this point, commentator Potapov, participating in a domestic service roundtable on 21 June, remarked that the "revanchist and chauvinistic slogans" used by the CDU "were literally copied word for word from the program" of the NPD. There is nothing surprising in this, the commentator added, because "the neofascists' program and the CDU's political concepts are in many ways similar," notably in their demands for "sole representation" of the German people and for a revision of the results of World War II.

Potapov said the CDU had leveled "wild attacks" on the "realistic aspects" of Brandt's policies toward the problem of strengthening European security and broadening relations with the socialist countries: The CDU has in fact attacked "what I would say is precisely the encouraging prospects that have opened up lately in relations, in particular between the Soviet Union and the FRG." He concluded that the CDU, by "juggling" the results of the elections, seeks to place in doubt the FRG's contacts with the Soviet Union and to foil any possibilities for detente in Europe.

Commentators largely ignore the election setbacks suffered by the FDP, the minor party in the coalition, and the possible consequences for government policy. Potapov observed that the elections have not brought about any large-scale changes in the positions of political forces in the FRG and that Brandt and other government leaders have stated that their outcome "will not influence the political course of the present government." On the 16th, the Moscow domestic service had briefly reported that Brandt, in remarks to SPD officials, had indicated that his government would "continue its course and strive to achieve its aims."

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An international review article in the 21 June PRAVDA by Ratiani joins Potapov in favorably assessing Brandt's foreign policy. According to Ratiani, Brandt "has been accused of every mortal sin merely because a few positive elements have entered his government's policy, elements which, should they be developed and implemented in practice, would have a favorable effect on the European situation." Leveling a largely pro forma attack on the CDU, Ratiani goes on to allege that Washington is displeased with Brandt's policies also. The article cites a Washington POST report that some "high-ranking figures in the Nixon Administration are alarmed that Brandt might display excessive zeal" in his attempts to reach agreement with the USSR, Poland, and the GDR. It goes on to quote from Henry Kissinger's "The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance," which it says reflects the "real position" of the White House on the dangers of the FRG's initiating "independent" steps toward the GDR.

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## EUROPEAN SECURITY

## BUDAPEST MEETING DISCUSSES PACT'S STAND ON SECURITY CONFERENCE

The communique on the 21-22 June Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, released by TASS on the 23d, again endorses the long-standing proposal for an "all-European conference" on security, noting that "a relevant document was unanimously approved" and "will be communicated to the governments of all interested states." Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski was reported by the Warsaw radio on the 23d as saying that a number of documents "to be published in the next few days" would "throw further light on the outcome of the conference."

GDR Foreign Minister Winzer, in remarks carried in East German media after his return to Berlin on 23 June, said that the new Pact proposals would be circulated among "the European states" and then published. Winzer's use of the term "European states" is more restrictive than the communique's "interested states." Moscow, for its part, had long been ambiguous and ambivalent on the matter of U.S. participation in such a conference. But a foreign ministry spokesman, in a 13 January 1970 press conference, said Moscow had informed Washington "of its favorable attitude to the participation of the United States in an all-European conference," adding that this view was shared by the other socialist states. Soviet propaganda since then has only infrequently broached the question of U.S. participation.

The communique on the Budapest meeting reports that the participants exchanged information on bilateral and multilateral contacts held in recent months on the question of holding a conference and took note of the "positive" response to the proposals put forward in Prague last October. The Prague meeting, the last previous gathering of Pact foreign ministers to discuss European security, had set forth a two-point agenda for a conference: renunciation of the use of force and the broadening of economic and other ties.

According to the communique, the Budapest participants stressed that direct participation of interested states at all stages of preparation for the conference was desirable. Taking this into consideration, the communique concludes, the foreign ministers reached agreement on "further important steps" aimed at insuring the success of a conference--steps designed "to achieve agreement on an agenda acceptable to all interested states and the methods of preparing the all-European conference, which could be started in the near future."

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"REACTION" TO NATO MEETING      Scant available comment from Eastern Europe includes a 21 June Budapest broadcast which, after noting that the Budapest gathering followed the NATO Council session in Rome by less than four weeks, commented that "the quick reaction shows in itself that the socialist countries have found positive elements in the Rome documents." The broadcast said the Rome meeting marked the first time NATO had gone beyond generalities with regard to a European security conference and had replied to the March 1969 initiative of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow propaganda at the time of the NATO meeting, while noting that the Italian foreign minister had been given the task of circulating that gathering's declaration among interested countries, had portrayed the document as a ruse to delay the convening of a European security conference.\*

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko, in remarks reported by CTK on the 23d, said that the NATO Council in Rome "could not take a negative stand" toward a conference on European security, concluding that "the future will show . . . whether the approach of the NATO countries toward European security and cooperation will be more concrete and constructive."

There has been no Soviet comment on the Budapest session so far. Moscow reported the scheduling of the meeting in a brief TASS item on 19 June, and confined its treatment of the gathering to reportage.

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\* Moscow's propaganda treatment of the 26-27 May NATO foreign ministers' meeting is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 May 1970, pages 25-26, and 3 June 1970, pages 18-19.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## DUBCEK AND CERNIK REMOVED FROM LATEST POSITIONS

The stepped-up drive against the top leaders of the 1968 liberalization was underscored as Czechoslovak media announced the almost simultaneous removal of former CPCZ First Secretary Alexander Dubcek and former Premier Oldrich Cernik from their latest posts.

DUBCEK     The Prague domestic service on 24 June said President Svoboda "has recalled Alexander Dubcek" from the post of Ambassador to Turkey and "entrusted him with another function." An Ankara radio report on 30 May, never confirmed by Czechoslovak media, said Dubcek had returned to the CSSR that day. The Ankara report took note of reports both that Dubcek, "suspended" from the party since January, would be finally expelled and that he had returned to visit his ailing mother.

High-level personal attacks on Dubcek continue in Czechoslovak media, presumably setting the stage for the fallen leader's expulsion from the party during the current "exchange of party cards" and his possible prosecution in a political trial.\* Thus a 17 June RUDE PRAVO article by CPCZ international department head Pavel Auersperg, commemorating the first anniversary of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, stressed that "as a result of the grave errors of Dubcek's leadership" the Czechoslovak party was "strongly affected by rightwing opportunism" in 1968-69.

CERNIK     On 23 June, CTK reported that Svoboda had recalled Cernik from the minor post of Minister Chairman of the Committee for Technical and Investment Development, "at his own request," with no indication of assignment to any other function. Cernik had joined publicly--in a low key--in the denigration of Dubcek which led up to the latter's dismissal as party First Secretary in April 1969, thus apparently buying time and making possible his retention of the premier's post until 28 January 1970, when he was succeeded by Strougal and downgraded to his latest position. He has not so far been the target of the public vilification directed at Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and other more liberal leaders of the 1968 experiment.

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\* Western news sources reported on the 23d that Czechoslovak Ambassador to Denmark Anton Vasek has asked for political asylum in that country for himself and his family, presumably to avoid recall and disciplinary action in the current purge.

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EULOGY           The further downgrading of Dubcek and Cernik was  
OF HUSAK       preceded, on the 22d, by an unusually fulsome  
                personal eulogy of Gustav Husak, in a Prague domestic  
service commentary which noted, among other things, that the CPCZ  
First Secretary is "often compared to Wladyslaw Gomulka and Janos  
Kadar"--other leaders who emerged from internal political upheavals.  
Defensively, the commentary went to considerable lengths to show  
that Husak had been an obstacle to the plans of the "rightist  
opportunists" since the start of the January 1968 reforms and  
had thus been the target of attacks by their press organs.

SOVIET           Soviet propaganda shows continued circumspection in  
RETICENCE       dealing with events in Czechoslovakia. Thus a two-  
                part series on Czechoslovakia by Mayevskiy in the  
19 and 20 June PRAVDA does not mention either Dubcek or Cernik,  
singling out for attack only Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Mlynar, Spacek,  
and others who have already been finally expelled from the party.

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## USSR SUPREME SOVIET

## SOME CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT REELECTED AS DEPUTIES

Except for those who are serving as ambassadors and those who have been retired or dismissed from their official positions since 1966, virtually all Central Committee members and candidate members have been reelected as Supreme Soviet deputies, according to the list published on 17 June. The handful who for no apparent reason were not reelected may be in danger of failing to be reelected to the Central Committee as well, at the forthcoming party congress.

One significant omission from the list of deputies is L.N. Yefremov, recently removed as Stavropol first secretary to become first deputy chairman of the state committee for science and technology. If Yefremov's new post does not warrant Supreme Soviet membership, it probably does not warrant Central Committee membership either. T.I. Sokolov, removed as Orel first secretary to become Gosplan first deputy chairman coincident with Yefremov's transfer, was reelected as a deputy.

Prospects for two of Shelepin's fading proteges appear dim. Former KGB chairman V. Ye. Semichastnyy, now a first deputy premier of the Ukraine, was not reelected, unlike the other two Ukrainian first deputy premiers, N.A. Sobol and N.T. Kalchenko. Semichastnyy's successor as Komsomol first secretary, S.P. Pavlov, now chairman of the state committee for physical culture and sports, was also not reelected to the Supreme Soviet.

Also dropped from Supreme Soviet membership were two prominent republican leaders who previously showed no signs of slipping: Ukrainian Central Committee Secretary V.I. Drozdenko--the only top Ukrainian leader excluded--and RSFSR first deputy premier K.G. Pysin. The other RSFSR first deputy premier, A.M. Shkolnikov, was reelected.

Two recently dismissed high-level propagandists, N.N. Mesyatsev and N.A. Mikhaylov (chairman of the radio-television committee and of the publishing committee, respectively) were not reelected. V.I. Stepakov, rumored on the way out as Central Committee agitprop chief, also failed to be reelected--unlike most of his fellow Central Committee section heads. There are reports, still unconfirmed, that Stepakov and Mesyatsev are to be appointed ambassadors, and their omission from the roll of deputies would be a natural consequence.

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Stepakov in particular will not necessarily be deprived of Central Committee membership, however, if he goes abroad as ambassador to China. A number of high-level political figures sent out as ambassadors as a form of exile in the past have subsequently been reelected to the Central Committee: P.A. Abrasimov, A.B. Aristov, A.V. Basov, I.A. Benediktov, A.M. Puzanov, and S.V. Chervonenko.

Also dropped from the Supreme Soviet were the new ambassador to Denmark, N.G. Yegorychev, and the former TASS director, D.P. Goryunov, now ambassador to Kenya; they may well not be reelected to the Central Committee. Cinema committee chairman A.V. Romanov, also rumored on the way out, was reelected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet--perhaps an indication that he is to remain as cinema chief.

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## CCP REBUILDING

## INCREASED ACTIVITY ON EVE OF 1 JULY PARTY ANNIVERSARY

On the eve of the 49th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to be commemorated on 1 July, there is increased propaganda attention to party organs and party rebuilding. Several provincial-level conferences on party rebuilding are reported, mention is made of provincial party core groups in the northeast area, Kirin forms its first county-level party committee, and Peking refers openly for the first time since the Ninth Congress to a reorganized party committee at the municipal level.

Provincial meetings on party rebuilding have been reported by Heilungkiang and Kwangtung, the only provinces to claim rebuilt municipal-level party committees, and seem aimed at providing new party-building achievements to celebrate the CCP anniversary. A 12 June Harbin radio report on Heilungkiang's 12 May-1 June conference on party building, which was conducted by the provincial party core group, warned that efforts to rebuild the party still faced possible obstruction both from the right, opponents of "the mass line," and from the left, those who negate the party by overemphasizing the mass line. Canton radio on 14 June reported that the Provincial Revolutionary Committee--not the party core group--conducted the Kwangtung conference, which was attended by leadership cadres of special districts, counties, and municipalities.

Earlier, on 23 May, NCNA reported a provincial-level conference in Hunan on party rebuilding, and on 29 April the Hupeh radio reported a provincial telephone conference on the subject. In mid-June, Tsinghai, Yunnan, and Shensi reported provincial-level directives calling for new mass campaigns to study the party constitution.

**KIRIN COUNTY COMMITTEE** On 17 June the Changchun radio, announcing the formation of the Huaite county party committee, stated that Wang Huai-hsiang, chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee (PRC) and "leader of the CCP core group" of the PRC, attended the Huaite county congress which elected the new committee. A KIRIN DAILY editorial, also broadcast on 17 June, welcomed "the first county-level leading organ of the party established in our province according to the new party constitution." Condemning those who mistakenly separate "the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee"

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from basic-level party organizations and "regard the basic-level party organizations as something dispensable," the editorial dismissed such thoughts as incorrect and reflective of a "weak party concept." It warned that basic-level party organizations, "especially those below the county level," are vital because without them "party leadership will become ineffective."

While provincial-level party core groups, presumably the forerunners of provincial party committees, have also been mentioned in recent broadcasts from Kwangtung, Heilungkiang, Tsinghai, Shantung, and Shensi, the Kirin broadcast is the first to specify that the PRC chairman is also head of the party group. (Shantung recently identified a number of members of its core group, including presumed acting chairman Yang Te-chih, but without specifying relative ranking. In 1967, Shansi and Tsinghai broadcasts had stated explicitly that the chairman and first vice chairman of their PRC's served also as head and deputy head of the core groups.)

CITY-LEVEL COMMITTEE      On 13 June, suddenly overcoming its apparent inhibitions against publicizing rebuilt party committees above the basic level, Radio Peking praised the Maoming municipal CCP committee in Kwangtung Province for its work in industrial coordination. Originally welcomed by Canton radio on 1 February, the municipal committee had not been mentioned in central media. As recently as 2 June, in a similar report on Maoming activities, NCNA spoke only of the leadership of the municipal revolutionary committee, although a Canton radio account of the same activities lauded the municipal party committee.

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